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In 1970, John Mackey was elected President of the National Football League 
Player's Association (NFLPA). His first round of negotiating with the team owners over 
a new labor contract set the stage for events that would alter the history of professional 
football. Mackey approached the meetings with an air of conviction yet he was willing to 
negotiate. The owners had previously stipulated that there were to be no lawyers present 
for either side and the players followed this directive. This move was designed to 
encourage what everyone had previously considered a familial atmosphere. However, 
when Mackey got to the meeting, Ted Kheel was present as labor counsel for the owners. 
The owners then pushed a contract in Mackey's face and demanded he sign it. Mackey 
did the smart thing and read the contract before he signed it. It included a clause stating 
that they relinquished the right to negotiate preseason pay for the players in perpetuity. 
Mackey disagreed with this clause and sought labor counsel from a firm in Minneapolis. 
Eventually, Ed Garvey would represent the players and give legal advice to Mackey 
throughout the course of the negotiations. 1 This was the context in which John Mackey 
and several other players filed Mackey v. NFL in 1972. 
The attitude displayed by the owners in these initial bargaining sessions was 
typical of their attitude toward the union. Carroll Rosenbloom, owner of the Baltimore 
Colts, told Mackey that the owners "don't need football, but you do." Mackey responded 
by saying that if Rosenbloom "didn't have tickets to give away, you wouldn't have any 
friends.,,2 This mindset typified the relationship between the union and the owners in the 
1 John Mackey, and Thorn Loverro, Blazing Trails: Coming of Age in Football's Golden Era (Chicago: 
Triumph Books, 2003), 172-4. 
2 David Harris, The League: The Rise and Decline of the NFL (New York: Bantam, 1986), 163. 
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early 1970s. The owners believed they could push the players to agree to anything they 
wanted, but the players were beginning to resist. 
In Mackey v. NFL, the players argued the Rozelle Rule was illegal under antitrust 
laws. The Rozelle Rule dealt with free agency and the ability of a player to sign with 
another team. The standard player contract of the period included an option clause in 
which the player could play an additional year with a 10% cut in pay. Once the player 
played out this option year, he could sign with another team. That team was then 
obligated to compensate the player's fomler team. If the two teams were unable to come 
to an agreement on compensation, Pete Rozelle would decide sufficient compensation for 
the player. The teams would then be obligated to abide by this decision no matter how 
fair or unfair it might be. Rozelle was responsible for this as he was Commissioner of the 
NFL.3 Elimination of this Rule would allow for greater free agency and would give 
players the opportunity to pursu~ higher salaries with whatever team they wanted. The 
players filed suit to eliminate this Rule and won their fight against the NFL in the 
courtroom. The Rozelle Rule was found to be a violation of antitrust legislation. 
However, a version of the Rozelle Rule remained in collective bargaining agreements and 
a better version of free agency did not exist until many years later. The players used this 
case to show the owners they were serious in negotiating and that the owners did indeed 
have to bargain in good faith. No longer could the owners stick a contract in their faces 
and demand they sign it. 
Much has been written about both sports labor history and sports history in 
general. David Harris' book The League: The Rise and Decline of the NFL details the 
3 John Fortunato, Commissioner: The Legacy of Pete Rozelle (Lanham, MD: Taylor Trade Publishing, 
2006), 151-2. 
history of the NFL along with the various challenges it faced from its inception to the 
mid-1980s.4 This includes the period relevant for Mackey v. NFL. The book provides a 
historical account of the league within the social context of the day but contains little 
analysis or examination of the legal issues surrounding the NFL. There are books that 
provide this legal background on the battles that have been fought over labor and other 
4 
sports issues. Paul Weiler and Gary Roberts' exhaustive text, entitled Sports and the Law, 
goes over major sports cases affecting every major professional and amateur sport.5 This 
provides some legal knowledge as well as analysis of the issues surrounding this case and 
free agency in general. More broadly, Labor Relations in Professional Sports covers the 
relationship between unions and owners in football, baseball, basketball and hockey. 6 
This book gives an account of how labor relations have developed over time throughout 
the major professional sports. 
These books provide a solid body of evidence about the history of the NFL as 
well as the major issues in sports labor. However, they do not analyze legal issues in the 
social context of the day. The 1970s were a time of change in all the major sports. Many 
battles were fought over labor. These issues were both social and legal and there is no 
scholarship that combines these two aspects in regards to football and free agency. 
Mackey v. NFL was a landmark case that had both social and legal ramifications. 
John Mackey sacrificed his football career for the good of the NFLP A. By the 
tinle he was done with his duties as president, his playing days were over. However, he 
4 David Harris, The League. 
5 Paul C. Weiler, and Gary R. Roberts, Sports and the Law: Text, Cases and Problems (81. Paul, MN: West, 
2004). 
6 Robert C. Berry, William B. Gould, and Paul D. 8taudohar, Labor Relations in Professional Sports 
(Dover, MA: Auburn House, 1986). 
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did leave a lasting legacy. As a result of his actions as president of the NFLPA, the 
players gained a meaningful seat at the bargaining table. When Mackey gained a 
leadership position, the owners assumed he would roll over and accept all their demands. 
They did not take the union seriously. His first task was to get the owners to realize that 
the players were no longer going to passively accept the demands of the owners and 
league authorities. As a union, they had legitimate power to negotiate and Mackey 
intended to exercise that power. 
The players fought long and hard to gain greater freedom and power in the 1970s. 
The courts gave the players power over the owners; however, the apparent victory won 
by the players did not translate into the gains that would be expected at the bargaining 
table. Many battles were fought along the way. This included the strike of 1974 and the 
ensuing battle between the players and owners. Both parties tried to gain the support of 
the public, and the success of the owners in so doing limited the ability of the players to 
make significant gains at the bargaining table. The actions of the new union president 
conlbined with the lack of support among the public doomed the efforts of the players to 
failure. 
Brief History of the NFL and NFLPA 
The NFL was originally founded in 1920 as the American Professional Football 
Association.7 The APFA changed their name to the NFL in 1922. This new league fielded 
18 teams.8 However, this did not end the challenges to professional football in the United 
7 National Football League. "NFL History 1911-1920." http://www.nfl.comlhistory/cbronology/1911-1920 
8 National Football League. "NFL History 1921-1930."< http://www.nf1.comihistory/chronology/1921-
1930> 
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States. The NFL had to deal with several challenges to its power by rival leagues, with 
the most serious coming from the American Football League (AFL) in the 1960s. The 
AFL was conceived by Lamar Hunt in 1959. He gathered support and the eight-team 
AFL began play in 1960 with Joe Foss, a South Dakota war hero, as the league's first 
commissioner.9 In April 1966, Foss resigned as commissioner and Al Davis was selected 
to replace him. 
The NFL and AFL were in constant competition over draft picks and television 
rights. Secret merger talks began shortly after Davis became AFL Commissioner between 
Hunt of the AFL and Tex Schramm, president of the NFL's Dallas Cowboys, as a way to 
bring peace to the situation. The plans for a merger were announced publicly by Pete 
Rozelle, commissioner of the NFL, on June 8, 1966.10 The merger would be implemented 
gradually over the course of several years. First, the leagues agreed to an AFL-NFL 
World Championship Game that would begin play in 1967. Also in 1967, the leagues 
began conducting a combined draft as well as playing inter-league preseason games. The 
merger became official in 1970 when the two leagues would begin playing full-time 
against each other. Pete Rozelle would continue as the commissioner of this new league, 
which would be known as the NFL. 11 This merger could have run into some antitrust 
issues, but Congress passed legislation on October 21, 1966 that exempted the agreement 
between the two leagues from any antitrust legislation or action. 12 
9 "American Football League Chronology - 1959" http://aflfootball.tripod.comlchronology/1959.html 
10 Harris, The League, 17,29-30. 
II National Football League, "NFL History, 1961-1970," http://www.nfl.com/history/chronologY/1961-
1970 
12 Fortunato, Commissioner, 74-6. 
With the merger of the two leagues, two labor unions also nlerged. During the 
beginning stages of the merger, the maintenance of separate unions actually hurt the 
players. The owners used this to their advantage as they were only required by law to 
bargain with one party. The first example of this came during the 1968 negotiations. The 
NFLP A represented only 16 of the 26 teams in the league. Players on the other ten teams 
agreed to the owners' proposal without telling the NFLP A. Therefore, the NFLP A was 
forced to approve this agreement and they were only able to achieve modest gains. 13 
The two unions merged in 1970 when it was again time to negotiate with the 
owners on a new labor agreement. The merger met with problems when it became 
apparent that the AFL teams were worried their concerns might be overrun by the larger 
NFLP A. The NFLP A promoted Ed Meador of the LA Rams for president while the 
AFLPA promoted their current president, Jack Kemp. John Mackey was a compromise 
candidate agreed upon by both parties. As the union had a small staff and large debts to 
cover, it was still in a weak position after the merger of 1970.14 
The union's weak position was exacerbated by actions of the owners, who 
attempted to break up the union during this pivotal time. Without the union to represent 
the players, the owners would be able to have complete control over every action within 
the league. The players fought against this tactic and survived as a union, albeit a weak 
13 NFL Players Association, "1960s - AFLINFL Competition," 
http://www.nflpa.com/AboutU slNFLP A History.aspx#5 
14 NFL Players Association, "AFL and NFL Players Associations Merge," 
http://www.nflpa.com/AboutUsINFLP A History.aspx#5 
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one. As a result, the players detennined to never again be bullied by the owners and to 
renew their fight to gain the freedom necessary to detennine their own actions. I5 
The Battle Between the Players and Owners 
John Mackey was a tight end for the Baltimore Colts when he was elected 
President of the NFLP A. He was first approached about the job by Carroll Rosenbloom, 
owner of the Baltimore Colts, and Sig Hyman, one of Rosenbloom's associates. Mackey 
took this pressure as recognition of his skills and his ability to do the job well. However, 
he did not know at the time that he was being approached because the owners believed he 
would be an easy person to control. In effect, he was being recruited to be a pawn of the 
owners.
I6 The owners believed they could control the union because they had complete 
control over the players. They were able to cut or trade any player, including a player that 
might also happen to be the head of the union. Without a head, the union would cease to 
function according to the logic of the owners and they would be free to run the league in 
the manner they wished without interference from the players. Mackey himself was cut 
by the Baltimore Colts in 1972 as was the common practice of the time. This also 
resulted in the owners believing they did not have to abide by specific laws, including 
antitrust legislation. I7 The owners used the system they had built to their advantage to run 
the NFL in the manner that they wished. 
15 Jo1m Mackey, "Athletes: Freedom Placed Above Economic Desires," New York Times, 26 May 1974, p. 
176. 
16 Mackey, Blazing Trails, 170-1. 
17 Edward R. Garvey, "From Chattel to Employee: The Athlete's Quest for Freedom and Dignity," Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 445 (1979): 96. 
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Mackey brought the same tough, hard-nosed attitude to the bargaining table that 
he displayed on the football field. He was detemlined to carry out the desires of the 
players and not let the owners attempt to break up the union again. 18 As a result, he had a 
specific plan for the players in the upcoming bargaining session with the owners. He 
outlined goals that dealt with revenue sharing and the standard contract. Mackey felt the 
players deserved a larger share of the revenue gained by the NFL from licensing. In the 
contract, he sought a better pension plan, improved preseason and severance pay, and the 
reworking of the option clause in the standard player contract. This option clause gave 
the team the option of retaining a player for a year after the contract expired with a 10% 
reduction in pay. Mackey went into the initial bargaining sessions with these goals in 
mind. 
However, once he got to the meetings, he realized these goals would not be 
accomplished as easily as he had hoped. The owners treated him as though he did not 
understand the process and that their goal was to make bargaining a short process in order 
to make it a so-called family affair. 19 Mackey realized the owners were trying to force 
him to agree to things he did not want so he called a lawyer. He got in touch with a labor 
firm in Minneapolis and requested to switch to a younger lawyer that would be able to 
better work with the players. Ed Garvey was then assigned to the NFLP A, and he went on 
to become the Executive Director of the NFLPA for a number of years and was very 
influential in its development.2o 
18 Dave Anderson, "John Mackey's Week," New York Times, 19 September 1972, p. 67. 
19 Mackey, Blazing Trails, 171. 
20 Mackey, Blazing Trails, 174. 
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One of the players' chief complaints with the current labor situation was the 
presence of the so-called Rozelle Rule, instituted by Pete Rozelle, which was an early 
limitation on free agency.21 It was designed to help create a stable market for the owners 
and to maintain the competitive balance in the league. There was a fear among the 
owners and Rozelle that if free agency were allowed with no restrictions, the teams in 
bigger markets would overrun the smaller market teams. The competitive balance of the 
league would then be thrown off. The Rozelle Rule also grew out of an unspoken 
agreement among owners at the time that they would not sign away a player from a 
fellow owner's team. It was the gentlemanly thing to do in the 1960s and 1970s.22 This 
agreement was viewed as a cornerstone of the league's policies by the owners.23 Without 
this rule, the owners believed the rich teams would run rampant over the other teams in 
the league and simply buy up all the talent. The weather could even affect the ability of 
teams to sign the talent. The teams in colder locales might be unable to get enough talent 
to be competitive or to even field a team if there were not restriction. Lamar Hunt, owner 
of the Kansas City Chiefs, described the situation that could result from eliminating the 
system as "complete bedlam.,,24 
Additionally, the Rozelle Rule developed as a response to the option clause in 
baseball and their lifetime reserve system.25 In baseball, the reserve clause provided for 
21 Mackey, Blazing Trails, 179-80. 
22 Paul C. Weiler, Sports and the Law, 206. 
23 Michael Maccambridge, America IS Game: The Epic Story of How Pro Football Captured a Nation (New 
York: Random House, 2004), 317. 
24 "Farewell to Feudalism." Time, 12 January 1976. 
25 Weiler, Sports and the Law, 206. 
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the ownership rights of a certain player. When a player signed a contract, he became the 
property of that particular team. If a player was traded, his ownership rights transferred to 
his new team. If a player retired and then tried to re-enter the league, the last team he had 
a contract with would still own his property rights. This reserve clause became important 
when considering the fact that most contracts were only for one year. Players had little 
option but to re-sign with the club they played for the previous year which resulted in 
lower pay and little job security. Football's version of this system was the Rozelle Rule.26 
It was incorporated into collective bargaining agreements beginning in the 1960s. As a 
result, the movement by players due to free agency was depressed within the league. The 
Rozelle Rule had accomplished its purpose in maintaining the competitive balance within 
the league and helping the smaller-market teams to avoid being swallowed up by the 
larger-market teams. 
The players did not like the Rozelle Rule and its effect on free agency within the 
league, for the same reasons that the owners liked it: it limited their movement and led to 
lower salaries. Ed Garvey, claimed that the reserve system helped the owners exploit the 
players in order to maximize profits. It gave the owners the power to control every action 
of players, including which team they would play for. The players were forced to play for 
the team they were assigned to, with little choice even after their contract expired and 
they were a free agent. Because of this inferior position, the players had an uphill battle to 
even gain a voice. The owners had control over their jobs, so they were at a severe 
disadvantage in the bargaining process.27 
26 Paul D. Staudohar, Playingfor Dollars Labor Relations and the Sports Business (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1996), 80. 
27 Garvey, "From Chattel to Employee," 92. 
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John Mackey was not the first player to challenge the legality of the Rozelle Rule 
in court. Joe Kapp, a quarterback for the New England Patriots, brought suit against the 
NFL. He contended the Rozelle Rule was a conspiracy that restrained trade and resulted 
in an illegal monopoly. Therefore, the standard player contract that enforced this policy 
was in violation of antitrust laws. Kapp v. NFL was decided in 1974 and sought $12 
million damages as the standard NFL contract violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. He 
argued he was due these damages because the NFL was the cause of his football career 
ending. His career ended because he refused to sign the contract and was not allowed to 
play until he signed the contract. The court rejected his claim and awarded no damages. 
However, the court did find that the present enforcement of the Rozelle Rule created an 
undue hardship on the players.28 
Mackey v. NFL was filed in October 1972 in the District Court of Minnesota 
challenging the validity of the Rozelle Rule under antitrust legislation. Mackey and 
fourteen other players sought either damages or injunctive relief against the NFL. The 
case has gone by the name of Mackey because he was president of the union at the time 
and responsible to filing the suit. 29 Kapp was decided before Mackey went to trial in 
1975. Therefore, this was the second challenge to the legality of the Rozelle Rule under 
the spectrum of a violation of antitrust legislation, specifically the Sherman Antitrust Act. 
Mackey had already encountered problems in his dealings with the owners as President 
of the NFLPA. While all players encountered the same problems in dealing with free 
agency issues, he took the step to file the suit on behalf of several other players. They felt 
28 Staudohar, Playing for Dollars, 80. 
29 Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F.Supp. 1000. 
that the Rozelle Rule effectively took away the free agent option they were supposed to 
have once their contract expired. They felt it was similar to the effect of the reserve 
clause in baseball. 30 
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Mackey approached the issue from a different angle. While Kapp attacked the 
legality of the standard player contract, Mackey questioned whether or not the restrictions 
on free agency were in fact a violation of antitrust legislation. Additionally, the suit 
questioned whether or not the agreement between the players and owners qualified for a 
nonstatutory labor exen1ption that would exempt any bargaining between the players and 
owners from antitrust examination.31 
Two different legal standards come into play with this case. Antitrust issues can 
be determined to be per se illegal or they can be found to violate the Rule of Reason 
standard. A restraint on trade can be declared per se illegal by the courts if it is found that 
the restraint is manifestly contrary to competition. In this case it is not necessary to prove 
that harm resulted from this law and any inquiry into the purpose of the statute is not 
necessary for it to be declared invalid. The Rule of Reason standard also deals with unfair 
restraints on trade. This standard involves determining that the practice restricts 
competition in the affected market. 32 
The players sought damages resulting from a violation of antitrust laws on the 
part of the owners through their continued enforcement of the Rozelle Rule. They 
claimed that the Rule constituted a per se violation of antitrust laws. However, if the 
30 Weiler, Sports and the Law, 206. 
31 Mackey v. NFL, 407 F.Supp. 1000. 
32 Mackey v. NFL, 407 F.Supp. 1000. 
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court found that it did not violate the per se standard, they contended that it also violated 
the Rule of Reason standard for evaluating antitrust legislation. In addition to damages, 
the players sought injunctive relief against the owners. 33 
The NFL responded to these claims to defend their actions and the Rozelle Rule. 
First, they disputed whether or not the per se standard could be applied in this case. They 
held the applicable standard was the Rule of Reason standard and that the Rozelle Rule 
did not violate this standard. Additionally, the NFL claimed that its actions were immune 
from antitrust action under the nonstatutory labor exemption. The NFL contended that a 
courtroom was not the proper place to fight this battle. The fight over the Rozelle Rule 
should be decided by the National Labor Relations Board as this was a labor issue, not an 
antitrust issue.34 
In court, the NFL argued that the Rozelle Rule was both reasonable and necessary 
to maintain the competitive balance of the league. This competitive balance was crucial 
to the success of the league. Without the Rozelle Rule ensuring this, the league would 
have ceased to function in its present form. They also presented evidence that argued that 
the Rule served the interests of the teams as well as the players through its enforcement. 35 
Without the Rozelle Rule, the NFL argued that professional football itself would cease to 
exist. The president of the Dallas Cowboys, Tex Schramm, supported this view which 
was widely reported by the New York Times. He believed the court could do nothing that 
would affect the NFL in the short-term, but that it could affect the long-term viability of 
33 Mackey v. NFL, 407 F.Supp. 1000. 
34 Mackey v. NFL, 407 F.Supp. 1000. 
35 Mackey v. NFL, 407 ESupp. 1000. 
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not only the NFL but all professional sportS.36 It was this attitude of the owners that the 
players were facing in their suit. The owners thought their system was inviolable and 
even the courts could not prevent them from running the league the way they wanted. 
While the courts might eventually affect the management of professional football, they 
could only do so in such a way that would affect all professional sports. This seemed to 
suggest that the owners believed that the only way change could be effected would be for 
something so drastic to happen, it would destroy all professional sports. In this way, 
football would not be singled out by the courts. The owners believed they were sheltered 
in their league and their power by the structure they had built for themselves. 
The players faced not only the owners but the media at this point. Commentators 
of the time viewed their attempt to change the rules as an attack on the NFL. The 
language used by sportswriters at the time was very negative when referring to the 
actions of the owners. William Wallace characterized the suit as an attack on the NFL 
from one of their own.37 Even after they filed the suit, the players continued to take action 
to get their voice heard in the media. In 1974, Mackey wrote an editorial in the New York 
Times. He was attempting to explain the position of the players to make up for the bias 
displayed by the media so far. They were simply trying to gain the freedom that everyone 
deserves. The media at the time was very influential in using negative language when 
describing the players' actions. Mackey sought to try to start changing public opinion 
prior to the strike of the players in 1974.38 
36 William N. Wallace, "NFL is Attacked on 'Rozelle Rule,'" New York Times, 25 May 1972, p. 59. 
37 Wallace, "NFL is Attacked on 'Rozelle Rule,'" p. 59. 
38 Mackey, "Athletes: Freedom Placed Above Economic Desire," p. 176. 
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The Court's opinion was written by Judge Earl Larson, the presiding judge of the 
trial, and rendered on December 30, 1975. Due to a pre-trial agreement between both 
parties, the trial was heard in front of a judge rather than a jury. This agreement of a trial 
was an important aspect in the case as both sides wanted an actual trial. The trial lasted 
for fifty-five days and involved testimony by players, owners and experts. The first part 
of Judge Larson's ruling confirmed that the NFL was in fact subject to antitrust laws, 
citing the precedent established by Radovich v. National Football League in 1957.39 
Larson found that the Rozelle Rule substantially restricted player movement and 
resulted in lower salaries than would otherwise be achieved. He also found that the Rule 
substantially interfered with interstate commerce in that it restricted the ability of the 
players to negotiate for an increased salary. This has resulted in the players not being 
able to adequately market their services to other teams in an open market. Without the 
Rozelle Rule, there would be increased player movement and increased bargaining power 
for the players. 40 
Therefore, Judge Larson held that the Rozelle Rule was a per se violation of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act. The NFL was not engaging in a bargaining relationship with the 
players and was in effect boycotting as a group. Based on precedent, this constituted a 
per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act as it unreasonably restrained trade and 
interstate commerce. Judge Larson also held that the Rozelle Rule was invalid under the 
Rule of Reason standard. The Rule was unreasonable in many respects. It was 
unreasonable in its broad application to all players regardless of their talent or ability to 
39 Mackey v. NFL, 407 F.Supp. 1000. 
40 Mackey v. NFL, 407 F.Supp. 1000. 
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earn a higher, more competitive salary. The Rule did not allow for the player to know if 
any other teams were even interested in signing him. The free agent was effectively 
excluded from the bargaining process under the Rozelle Rule. Additionally, it was 
unreasonable in that its duration was unlimited. The restriction applied to every player 
throughout his career and he was never truly a free agent, able to negotiate with other 
teams for his services.41 
Judge Larson also denied the NFL's claim to a labor exemption. He held that the 
exenlption only applied to the activities of employees or unions, not to the actions of 
employers such as the NFL. The Rozelle Rule was not a bargained aspect of any 
agreement. The owners had simply refused to negotiate on that aspect of any collective 
bargaining agreement. He also found that the Court was in fact within its jurisdiction to 
decide a case such as this and that it was not the responsibility of the NLRB as the NFL 
had claimed. The Rozelle Rule was found to be in violation of antitrust laws and 
therefore illega1.42 
The NFLP A was happy with this outcome. It was a vindication of everything they 
had fought for in the past three years. This case was significant to the players in that it 
was the first case to go to trial testing policies of the NFL. Therefore, it could only be 
overturned on points of legality. Ed Garvey expressed the union's opinion on the case. He 
pointed out the significance of the case in light of past struggles of the players. As the 
Chicago Tribune reported, "in 1974, the NFL players struck for freedom. Today, the 
federal courts said they deserve the right guaranteed other citizens in our country. 
41 Mackey v. NFL, 407 F.Supp. 1000. 
42 Mackey v. NFL, 407 F.Supp. 1000. 
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Professional football will flourish under this ruling.,,43 Many also believed this ruling was 
important in the bargaining relationship. The players had won a position of greater power 
when bargaining with the owners and with the teams.44 
The league had a different view of the outcome. An appeal was planned 
immediately upon hearing Larson's decision. This move would also give the owners time 
before they had to implement any forced changes. Rozelle, as Commissioner, made a 
statement regarding the opinion on the league following the ruling. The owners "had 
hoped that the court would find the antitrust laws sufficiently flexible to accommodate 
the unique and special needs of a professional football league." Commentators such as 
Red Smith believed that the owners simply wanted special treatment and the ability to 
bend the laws to their liking without necessarily outright breaking them.45 
At this point, the tide of media opinion appeared to switch to the side of the 
players. Commentators of the time viewed the actions of the owners in a very negative 
light. They were described as having an almost feudal mentality with the way they ran the 
league. Red Smith even went so far in the New York Times to suggest that the owners 
might eventually have to start obeying the law.46 This attitude was a complete reversal 
from the attitude displayed only a few years prior. The media was now moving against 
the owners and on the side of the players. Once the District Court made this ruling, the 
opinion of commentators seemed to change to side with the players. 
43 "U.S. Judge Sacks Rozelle Rule," Chicago Tribune, 31 December 1975, Sec. B, p. 1. 
44 Wallace, "Rozelle Rule Found in Antitrust Violation," New York Times, 31 December 1975, p. 27. 
45 Red Smith, "We Hoped the Laws Were Flexible," New York Times, 2 January 1976, p. 39. 
46 Smith, "We Hoped the Law were Flexible," p. 39. 
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The NFL disagreed with this ruling and appealed to the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit on June 17, 1976. The players sought for the decision of the District Court 
to be upheld. They made the same argument before the Appeals Court that the Rozelle 
Rule violated antitrust law in that it was an illegal restraint on trade and denied the 
players the ability to negotiate freely with other teams. The appeal of the NFL centered 
around two main issues with the ruling of the District Court. The NFL challenged the 
ruling that the NFL did not qualify for a labor exemption that would make it immune to 
an antitrust suit. Additionally, the NFL challenged the finding that the Rozelle Rule 
violated antitrust legislation.47 
The opinion was handed down on October 18,1976 and written by Judge Lay. 
The Court upheld the decision of the District Court, though the reasoning was somewhat 
different. Judge Lay held that while the NFL could possibly invoke the nonstatutory labor 
exemption in regards to antitrust policy, it could not be invoked in this case. Since the 
Rozelle Rule was not achieved as a result of good-faith bargaining on both sides, the 
exemption did not apply. In contrast to the opinion of Judge Larson, the Appeals Court 
held that the Rozelle Rule was not a per se violation of antitrust policy. However, it did 
not meet the Rule of Reason Standard as currently enforced. Therefore, the Rozelle Rule 
was again struck down by the Appeals COurt.48 The NFL eventually appealed to the 
Supreme Court, but the writ of certiorari was denied and the decision of the Appeals 
Court stood.49 
47 Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606. 
48 Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606. 
49 National Football League v. Mackey, 434 U.S. 801. 
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Throughout this ordeal in the courts, the players and owners were again at the 
bargaining table attempting to hammer out a new collective bargaining agreement. The 
agreement from 1970 had expired and it was again time to negotiate. The experience of 
the players was similar to other attempts at bargaining with the owners. The owners were 
still refusing to discuss the Rozelle Rule and other issues that dealt with the freedom of 
players. Mackey reiterated several times that the players were not interested in economic 
issues as much as issues of freedom. He took this argument to the public in an editorial in 
the New York Times where he expressed his opinion that economic concerns were 
secondary to those of freedom. The players believed that the freedom they sought would 
result in a better league. This bargaining process was not about salary, but about the 
ability of the players to negotiate freely with teams and to not have their every move 
scrutinized by the league office. The players, as expressed by Mackey, would stop at 
nothing this time to gain the freedom they so desperately wanted and believed they 
deserved. 50 At this point, the players were simply waiting on the decision of the courts. 
They were sure that the courts would find the Rozelle Rule illegal and therefore it would 
no longer be necessary to fight with the owners on including it in various bargaining 
agreements.51 The players were sinlply playing a waiting game at this point. They 
believed if they waited long enough to negotiate, the courts would vindicate their 
position. 
As a result of the impasse in negotiations in 1974, the players went on strike to 
have their demands heard. The dispute got so bad that the two sides could not agree on 
50 Mackey, "Athletes: Freedom Placed Above Economic Desires," 176. 
51 Bob Logan, "NFL Pact Rejected by Players," Chicago Tribune, 11 September 1975, Sec. p.4. 
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what they were arguing about in the negotiations. The players went on strike and used the 
media to have their voice heard. Sports Illustrated reported that while the two sides could 
not agree on the dispute, the players could take their side to the public to gain public 
support. One of the first steps in this campaign was picketing outside training camp. The 
camp was still going on with only rookies participating. In San Diego, several players 
stood outside in the heat holding signs, picketing for freedom. While they could not enter 
the training camp, they still ensured television coverage of their actions and their 
position.52 This was part of the plan of the players to force the owners to agree to their 
position. The show of the picket lines was designed to entice public support to their side. 
They did not have the courts on their side as of yet as the case had not been decided, but 
the players hoped the tide of public support against the owners because of the strike 
would help their cause. It was part of a campaign by the players to discredit the owners in 
the eyes of the public, especially the ticket-buying pUblic. But during this strike, the 
players forgot one crucial element: money. 
Their position continued to be that the Rozelle Rule was inherently unfair because 
of its structure. The Rule was to be enforced by Rozelle himself. The players saw him as 
a pawn of the owners as well. Therefore, any action taken by Rozelle in enforcing this 
policy would be to the advantage of the owners and not the players.53 The players were 
content to let the courts decide the issue as they believed they had little other recourse to 
fight the owners. They could not go to the league and they could not bargain on the issue 
in good faith, so they waited on the decision. 
52 Joe Marshall, "Solidarity with Solidity," Sports Illustrated 41, no. 3 (1974): 57. 
53 Red Smith, "Football's Long Hot Summer II," New York Times, 25 April 1975, p. 54. 
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The players were fighting to gain the freedom and power to negotiate their own 
salaries with the team they wanted. This would obviously be to their benefit to have this 
power. Simply because it made sense to them, they forgot the importance of the opinion 
of the fans. They were picketing to gain the attention of the public to attempt to get them 
on their side. However, their argument was one based on emotion and freedom. The fans 
were interested in how it would affect their own pocket and bank account. While the 
players appealed to the emotion of the fans, they forgot to explain how their demands 
would not have an impact on the wallets of the fans. 
The media was beginning to get fed up with the situation between the players and 
the owners at this point. Both sides were attempting to court the opinion of the fans and 
the public, but the media was beginning to view neither side favorably. Red Smith of the 
New York Times argued that the fight between the players and the owners was just 
picking back up again. The fight was continuing on and it was getting old quickly. The 
players and the owners were just as unwilling to compromise at this point as they had 
been in the past. He saw no end in sight to the conflict. The media was beginning to tum 
on both sides. 54 
The owners, again, did not take the demands of the players seriously. They 
believed that every demand came down to money and that the demands for freedom were 
not to be taken seriously. Therefore, they refused to bargain unless the issues that dealt 
with freedom, namely the Rozelle Rule, were taken off the table. Now, the owners are 
trying to reverse course and force the union to bargain on the Rozelle Rule. This would 
legitimize the Rule because it would then be a result of a legitimate bargaining session. 
54 Smith, "Football's Long Hot Summer II," p. 54. 
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This was the standard that had to be met under the ruling of the Appeals Court. 55 The 
owners believed they could force the players to agree to a revised version of the Rozelle 
Rule. 56 
They also conducted a public relations campaign to get the public on their side. 
The players continued their strike at the first exhibition game of the 1974 season, the Hall 
of Fame game. The players planned to block the entrance of the players to the stadium 
and prevent the game from being played. A massive logistical plan was put in place by 
the owners to allow the game to continue. Through a monumental effort, the game was a 
success. Since the veterans were on strike, the teams were made up of rookies. Therefore, 
the games were played by rookies. Since this was not as desirable a product, the owners 
offered refunds to any ticket holders for games played by the rookies. As Sports 
Illustrated noted this was the most successful measure undertaken by the owners during 
the strike. 57 The owners had more resources at their disposal and used them well during 
the strike. Their public relations campaign was much more successful than that of the 
players. 
The success of the owners was evident in the attitude of the fans. By the time of 
the Hall of Fame game in August of 1974, many fans had already had enough. They were 
frustrated with the lack of progress and the incessant fighting between the players and the 
owners. This frustration did not end just as the internal conflict did not end. 58 The 
displeasure of the fans took many forms. They were disgusted with the constant bickering 
55 Red Smith, "Football and Union-Busters," New York Times, 14 September 1975, p. 191. 
56 Logan, "NFL Pact Rejected by Players," p. 4. 
57 Ray Kennedy, "Star-Struck Canton," Sports Illustrated 41, no. 6 (1974): 10-3. 
58 Ray Kennedy, "A Strike Forces the Issue," Sports Illustrated 43 no. 13 (1975): 56. 
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with no real progress. They did not think the athletes deserved more money as they 
already made more than the average blue-collar worker. The fans did not buy into the 
argument that the players needed more freedom. To them, this increased freedom would 
only result in higher ticket prices and more expense to them as fans. Fans even went so 
far as to form a club to represent their interests. United Sports Fans was supposed to 
represent the interests of the fans as they were the ones who paid the bills. They did not 
support the argument of the owners that it cost them money to pay the players more. Fans 
of the 1970s viewed any increase in salary for the players as coming directly out of their 
pocket. Support for the owners during this period was high. Surveys had the support of 
the owners at 80% and it was higher in certain cities. 59 The opinion of the fans was 
perhaps stated best by the owners' labor counsel, Ted Kheel, when he told a reporter 
from Sports Illustrated, "Let's face it, the fans are primarily interested in having this 
damn thing over with, not in the arbitrability of the issues.,,6o The fans were clearly on the 
side of the owners in this debate. Their public relations campaign was much more 
effective than that of the players. 
The owners recognized the importance of money in this debate. They did not want 
to have to shell out additional money to pay the players the higher salaries that would 
result from decreased restrictions on free agency. They also knew that the issue of money 
would be important to the fans. In their campaign for public support, the owners used the 
appeal of money to win the opinion of the fans. They made moves to lessen the impact of 
any strike or other action by the players on the wallet of the fans. This appeal was 
59 Kennedy, "Star-Struck," 10-3. 
60 Kennedy, "Star-Struck," 13. 
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effective. While the players made a good emotional argument, the campaign to positively 
affect the wallet of the fans was a success. 
Unlike the media who became fed up with both parties in the argument, the fans 
took a side in the argument. They were won over by the owners and their argument about 
saving the fans money. The media did not dissuade the fans from siding with the owners; 
however, they might have had an impact on the perception of the players. The demands 
of the players were always portrayed in a negative light by commentators and 
sportswriters, while the denlands of the owners were portrayed in both a positive and 
negative light. This combined with the campaign by the owners to win public opinion 
was successful. The last straw for the fans appears to have been the strike of 1974. They 
were fed up with the situation and the demands of the players. These demands were not 
taken seriously by the fans. The media was against both the players and the owners at this 
point, so the fans were won over by the actions of the owners to save them money. 
While the owners won the battle of public opinion, the players won the battle in 
the courts. The immediate result of this victory should have been the elimination of the 
Rozelle Rule from future collective bargaining agreements. However, the collective 
bargaining agreement signed in 1977 still included the Rozelle Rule.61 The players had 
agreed to essentially a watered-down version of the Rule. The NFLP A simply agreed to a 
different method of free agent compensation. The present team of the free agent now had 
the right to refuse the offer or be compensated by future draft picks rather than current 
players. This method actually proved to be more restrictive than the system under the 
61 Staudohar, Playingfor Dollars, 80. 
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Rozelle Rule. The cost to the team could be higher than before.62 The 1982 agreement 
lessened the restrictions on free agency, but they were still there.63 The players had yet to 
achieve the free agency they sought when they filed suit against the NFL. They did gain 
benefits from the collective bargaining agreements in 1977 and 1982 even though they 
were not free agency. In 1977, the players negotiated for the restoration of union security 
and improvements in the disability and pension plans for players. In 1982, the players 
gained a better foothold in revenue sharing and in establishing a scale of minimum 
salaries.64 
In the negotiations following this ruling, the players announced they were willing 
to bargain. By this time, Mackey was no longer President of the NFLP A. The new 
president was Dick Anderson. Despite the victory won in courts, Anderson went into 
these sessions with the stated goal of bargaining on the Rozelle Rule. The negotiations 
had reached a standstill and this was seen as a conciliatory gesture. It was the most 
contentious issue yet to be addressed in the sessions and was preventing much of the 
progress from occurring. Anderson believed football could reach a compromise because 
other major professional sports had been able to reach a compromise on similar issues. 
This was his response to the actions of the Appeals Court in throwing out the Rozelle 
Rule. He was willing to bargain with the owners in return for possibly reaching an 
62 Weiler, Sports and the Law, 231. 
63 Staudohar, Playing/or Dollars, 80. 
64 Weiler, Sports and the Law, 231, 238. 
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agreement. 65 To Anderson, reaching a new agreement was more important than 
sustaining the recent gains the players had been able to achieve in court. 
In addition to the new union chief, the players had to contend with the opinion of 
the public and the media. They were facing an uphill battle in gaining the support of the 
media and the fans for their contract demands. They had just fought a long and costly 
battle in the courts and could not afford another battle against the media and fans. The 
loss of public support for their denlands was a significant factor in their decision to 
negotiate and give away some of the gains they had just won in court. They did not win 
the battle in the court of public opinion. 
The players rejected the subsequent agreements reached by Anderson and the 
owners. They were still trying to find a way to keep the gains they had fought so hard for 
in court. A new collective bargaining agreement was finally reached in 1977 in which the 
players made significant gains in areas other than the Rozelle Rule. As a result of their 
rejection of the initial offer, the owners were forced to make extra concessions to the 
players. The union also made gains in their relative power. After the strikes and failed 
bargaining of previous years, the union was finally on solid footing. The treasury had 
been emptied by the long court fights and the owners were content to let them spend their 
money and go bankrupt. Their strategy was to wait out the union and let it disappear. 
Again, they were unsuccessful. The union was now in a much better position both 
financially and at the bargaining table. This resulted from the determination of the union 
to never be bullied by the owners after they were forced to accept a contract they did not 
65 Cooper Rollow, "We'll Bargain on Rozelle Rule: New Union Chief," Chicago Tribune, 19 March 1976, 
Sec. C, p. 3. 
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want in 1970.66 While Anderson was content to agree to other conditions, the players as a 
whole held out for better options from the owners. As a result, they gained a better labor 
contract. The Rozelle Rule was still in effect, but the players had succeeded in making 
significant gains at the bargaining table and forcing the owners to give in to some of their 
demands. The gains were not the ones initially fought for, but they were important 
nonetheless. 
Conclusion 
The gains the players made in subsequent negotiations with the owners seem on 
the surface to be contradictory to the reasons they filed Mackey v. NFL. They also seem 
to show the players ignoring the victory they won in the decision. They had won the case 
and millions of dollars in damages from the NFL. They also succeeded in having the 
Rozelle Rule declared illegal under antitrust laws. Therefore, it would make sense that 
their first move upon winning this case would be to abolish it forever from further 
collective bargaining agreements. However, this did not happen. The rule remained as did 
strong restrictions on free agency. This case is widely considered to be a landmark case in 
sports labor and more specifically in the history of labor in the NFL, yet the players 
bargained away the rights and ground they gained the very next year at the bargaining 
table. 
While the players did not take advantage of the most obvious gain from Mackey v. 
NFL, they certainly did not ignore the decision. The decision and its effects proved to be 
vital to the union and the interests of the players over the years. The decision solidified 
66 Kenneth Delinger, "Garvey, Union Can Be Proud of their Stand; NFL Players Move From Surviving to 
Shopping," The Washington Post, 27 February 1977, Sec. D, p. 1. 
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their position at the bargaining table.67 The NFLPA now had a legitimate answer to the 
owners when they tried to say the union was not valid or it was not important to 
recognize them at the bargaining table. The appeals decision held that the players must be 
given a seat at the bargaining table. The owners had to bargain with them in good faith to 
achieve the nonstatutory labor exemption.68 This was not done with the Rozelle Rule and 
this failure, in part, led to it being declared invalid. John Mackey had trouble when he 
became President of the NFLP A getting the owners to listen to his denlands and take him 
seriously. He was elected in part because the owners thought they could bully him into 
agreeing into whatever they wanted. Now the players had legal ground to gain standing at 
the bargaining table. No longer could the owners take their wishes for granted. They had 
to negotiate with the players and recognize the legitimacy and power of the union. The 
decision and the recognition of the NFLPA as a bargaining power helped to create the 
labor relationship between the owners and players to this day. The league has not had to 
deal with as many strikes or threats of lockouts as have other professional sports. The 
good bargaining relationship that led to this had its beginning in Mackey v. NFL. 
While the players did gain a better seat at the bargaining table, this power had a 
caveat. According to the ruling of the Appeals Court, the reserve system and the Rozelle 
Rule had to be a result of good faith bargaining. If this bargaining took place, any type of 
rule or procedure would be legally valid. It was this bargaining that made it legal. 
Therefore, if the players bargained on the Rozelle Rule or any other provision, that 
provision would not be subject to antitrust laws. The courts had passed responsibility for 
antitrust laws to the unions. They would now be in charge of ensuring the NFL did not 
67 Robert C. Berry, Labor Relations in Professional Sports, 107. 
68 Mackey, Blazing Trails, 186. 
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violate the law. The owners also had their provision that could allow their policies to 
continue. This was why it was so important to the players to be successful in their 
bargaining and why they went on strike in 1974. If they relented and compromised with 
the owners at that point, this ruling would not have had the same effect. The position of 
the players would have been weakened.69 This caveat in the ruling gave the owners the 
position they needed to force bargaining issues with the players. They did not achieve all 
the gains they wanted to when they filed the suit. 
The erosion of fan support, ifit even existed, for the position of the players also 
played into their actions in bargaining with the owners. The fans had made it clear during 
the strike and the year after that they were growing sick of the endless bickering over 
labor issues. They did not view the freedom issues the same way the players did. 
Mackey's effort to persuade them with an editorial and the dramatic portrayal of the 
strike did not work. The owners succeeded in courting the opinion of the public. This 
played a part in the efforts of the players to bargain after the case was decided. Many 
factors played into it, but the failure to persuade the public to their position played a part 
in their actions. 
The players used many tactics to fight the owners and to gain freedom and power 
throughout the 1970s. They fought through negotiations, the courts, the media and the 
fans. What began as a move to gain greater freedom through free agency became 
something different as the court case progressed. The players wanted the Rozelle Rule to 
be eliminated to allow for greater freedom to negotiate and sign with other teams. This 
led to them filing a court case. They were not getting anywhere through negotiations with 
the owners due to the owners' attitude toward the players and their demands. They took 
69 Kennedy, "Star-Struck," 12-3. 
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their fight to the courts. In the midst of this court battle, the players tried to win over the 
opinion of the fans and the media. At first, the media was firmly against the players and 
their demands. However, this changed once the attitude of the owners became more 
apparent. The media recognized the owners were willing to bend the laws and treat the 
players with less respect and dignity then they deserved. However, they did not win the 
affections of the fans. They sided with the owners and their wallets. The owners offered 
better financial incentives to the fans. The players could only counter with ideological 
arguments and the fans did not want this. They wanted to see tangible benefits to them. 
The one area the players did win in was the courts. Mackey v. NFL was decided in their 
favor and the Rozelle Rule was found to be illegal. 
While the players won this victory in the courts, the battles they lost in the public 
arena led to them being unable to completely eliminate the Rozelle Rule. In combination 
with the new union chief who was willing to negotiate, the players could not push 
through vast reform of the bargaining agreements of the day. The fans and the media 
were against them and the players had expended too much energy fighting in the courts to 
continue the battle. This ultimately led to the bargaining agreements of 1977 and 1982 
that still included the Rozelle Rule. While the players fought for freedom and power in 
the 1970s, they were ultimately unable to achieve the gains they wanted due to the new 
union chief and the loss of public support. 
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